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Abstract 
The concept of fluid sovereignty denotes configurations of state authority in which 
flows of living and non-living things, within and across borders, render insecure 
claims of unconditional territorial control. Loss of monopoly control of the means of 
violence within a territory conventionally signals weak political sovereignty. Bordering 
Israel (including the occupied Golan Heights) and Syria, the Hasbani Basin, southern 
Lebanon, seems to exemplify such sovereign failings: over decades, rival security 
providers have provoked political instability and conflict in the region. However, fluid 
sovereignty brings to the fore state-nature relations neglected in scholarship on 
“fragile” or “failing” states. Informed by geographical work on hybrid sovereignties 
and vital materialism, we show how sovereign claims over the Hasbani Basin extend 
to (sub)terranean water sources and rainfall-dependent agricultural lands, both of 
which are deeply securitized. Incomplete centralization and territorialization by 
Lebanon of the Hasbani Basin evinces fractured state nature—the inability of the 
state to realize volumetric control of, and authority over, basin waters. This state 
nature is coproduced by the fluid materiality of the waters themselves, whose hydro-
climatic circulation and contingencies are at odds with territorial designs for 
volumetric control. For rural communities in the Hasbani Basin economically 
dependent on access to agricultural water, field research reveals a practical 
experience of fluid sovereignty, both in adapting to water variability and also 
navigating use of agricultural borderlands subject to conflict-related dangers. Recent 
conflict spillovers from the Syrian war have reinforced, for the majority Druze 
population, the low legitimacy of Lebanese state nature. 
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(2) Abstract 
The concept of fluid sovereignty denotes configurations of state authority in which 
flows of living and non-living things, within and across borders, render insecure 
claims of unconditional territorial control. Loss of monopoly control of the means of 
violence within a territory conventionally signals weak political sovereignty. Bordering 
Israel (including the occupied Golan Heights) and Syria, the Hasbani Basin, southern 
Lebanon, seems to exemplify such sovereign failings: over decades, rival security 
providers have provoked political instability and conflict in the region. However, fluid 
sovereignty brings to the fore state-nature relations neglected in scholarship on 
“fragile” or “failing” states. Informed by geographical work on hybrid sovereignties 
and vital materialism, we show how sovereign claims over the Hasbani Basin extend 
to (sub)terranean water sources and rainfall-dependent agricultural lands, both of 
which are deeply securitized. Incomplete centralization and territorialization by 
Lebanon of the Hasbani Basin evinces fractured state nature—the inability of the 
state to realize volumetric control of, and authority over, basin waters. This state 
nature is co-produced by the fluid materiality of the waters themselves, whose hydro-
climatic circulation and contingencies are at odds with territorial designs for 
volumetric control. For rural communities in the Hasbani Basin economically 
dependent on access to agricultural water, field research reveals a practical 
experience of fluid sovereignty, both in adapting to water variability and also 
navigating use of agricultural borderlands subject to conflict-related dangers. Recent 
conflict spillovers from the Syrian war have reinforced, for the majority Druze 
population, the low legitimacy of Lebanese state nature. 
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Introduction 
Political instability and violent conflict are routine markers for contested or collapsing 
state authority in the post-Cold War world, especially in those dangerous, unruly 
spaces judged by the West to threaten national and international security. Whether 
“fragile,” “failing,” or “failed,” the absence of effective sovereignty is often equated 
with the dispersal of control of the means of violence amongst rival security providers 
(Zartman 1995; Rotberg 2004; von Trotha 2005); and despite critical objections, 
including from geographers, to a causal inference that bypasses wider geopolitical 
and geo-economic drivers (Sidaway 2003; Elden 2009; Jeffrey 2009; Fregonese 
2012; Grimm, Lemay-Hébert, and Nay 2014), the global policy currency of fragile 
statehood is bolstered by Western cartographies of conflict in which weak 
governments are disabled or overrun by other wielders of armed force. 
 
Bordering Israel (including the occupied Golan Heights) and Syria, the Hasbani 
Basin, southern Lebanon (Figure 1), has long witnessed political instability and 
armed conflict. Over decades, (para)military actors have undermined Lebanese 
territorial sovereignty and fueled ethno-religious tensions. In the 1970s the presence 
in southern Lebanon of the Palestine Liberation Organization, engaged in violent 
exchanges with Maronite Christians and Israel, triggered a civil war that unleashed 
sectarian antagonisms and rival interventions by external powers. Israeli invasions in 
1978 and 1982, followed by occupation of the south, fuelled a Shi’a-led resistance 
which, with Iranian and Syrian support, evolved into Hizbullah (Abboud and Muller 
2012, 29-34; Avon and Khatchadourian 2012, 23-33). The majority Druze population 
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in the Hasbani Basin, politically marginalized at the national level, presently coexists 
pragmatically, if uneasily, with Hizbullah and its Shi’a supporters. At the time of the 
2005 “Cedar Revolution” leading Druze politicians (notably Walid Jumblatt) were part 
of a national coalition opposing Hizbullah and Syrian interference in Lebanon (Norton 
2007, 126), but more recently a perceived escalating threat posed both by Israel and 
Syrian-based Islamist militants has created shared security concerns. In the Hasbani 
Basin current instability is most obvious in the tense stand-off between Hizbullah and 
the Israeli military, which marks out a dynamic zone of insecurity across, and 
beyond, a United Nations-demarcated Blue Line.1 Monitored by the United Nations 
Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), the Hasbani borderlands include both signposted 
sites of high risk (e.g. minefields) and less visible, but still pervasive, spaces of 
danger (e.g. shifting “no-go” areas). 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
 
The theoretical concern of this article is with state-nature relations neglected in 
scholarship on fragile states. Informed by work on hybrid sovereignties and vital 
materialism, we show how sovereign claims over the Hasbani Basin extend to 
(sub)terranean water sources and rainfall-dependent agricultural land, both of which 
are deeply securitized. Incomplete centralization and territorialization by Lebanon of 
the Hasbani basin evinces a fractured state nature—the inability of the state to 
assert volumetric control of, and authority over, basin waters. This state nature 
(Whitehead, Jones, and Jones 2007) is abstracted from, but co-produced by, the 
fluid materiality of the waters themselves, whose hydro-climatic circulation and 
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contingencies are at odds with territorial designs for volumetric control. To capture 
the onto-political dynamic here, we label as fluid sovereignty those configurations of 
state authority in which flows of living and non-living things, within and across 
borders, render insecure claims to unconditional territorial rule.  
 
The materiality of, in the Hasbani case, contested hydrological volumes and flows 
cannot be separated from the experience of water- and weather worlds with their 
own turbulent rhythms (Ingold 2015, 69-72; Steinberg and Peters 2015, 256). 
Geographical research on conflict-affected borderlands is increasingly attuned to the 
everyday experiences and practices of those encountering fractured projections of 
sovereignty (Alatout 2009; Doevenspeck 2011; Korf and Raeymaekers 2013). 
Regional field research conducted in 2013 and 2014—comprising a purposive 
survey of 294 farming households, a focus group in Hasbaya and follow-up 
interviews— centered on agricultural communities in the basin.2 The empirical 
interest in farming communities is justified by the fact that up to 70 per cent of the 
regional population works in agriculture and also that this is a water-dependent 
sector sensitive to hydro-political instability and hydro-climatic changes, including 
projected dryer and warmer conditions as a consequence of climate change 
(Farajalla et al. 2014).The field research examined the affective conditions of fluid 
sovereignty; that is, how farming households experiencing an unstable environment 
practically cope with uncertain access to agricultural water. 
 
In the next section, the theoretical contours of fluid sovereignty are first set out with 
reference to hybrid models of sovereignty, highlighting their application to southern 
Lebanon. Drawing on Derrida’s notion of divisible sovereignty, we extend this hybrid 
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framing to the entwining of human and more-than-human elements in what Depledge 
calls an “assembly of geopower” (2015, 91)—the means by which forms of matter 
and life are calibrated, combined and organized to facilitate territorial governance. 
Empirically, the article then reveals three salient, inter-related figures of fluid 
sovereignty in the Hasbani Basin: (i) the hydro-political articulation of state natures 
as disputed volumetric claims over water; (ii) the politically destabilizing effects of 
unpredictable hydro-climatic flows circulating within and across territorial borders; 
and (iii) the draining of state legitimacy, in the eyes of Hasbani Basin farmers, arising 
from the perceived failure of the Lebanese state to secure for them safe, reliable 
access to agricultural water. In the conclusion we consider whether fluid sovereignty 
is arguably no more than a heightened condition of the very distributive system of 
sovereignty itself, where material and symbolic flows may escape projections of 
volumetric authority. 
 
 
Fluid sovereignty 
Fluid sovereignty thus denotes state-nature relations in which flows of living and non-
living things unsettle territorialized systems of state power. we follow here the 
account of Whitehead, Jones, and Jones (2007, 14-15) that modern statehood 
features the extraction and use of natural (material) forms to exercise political power. 
This “framing” of the natural world is seen to operate through acts of centralization 
and territorialization: centralization entails the generation of standardized knowledge 
about nature that creates a field of state power over particular facets of nature; while 
territorialization involves the use of spatial metrics and geopolitical strategies to 
control and regulate nature. However extensive these processes, the production of 
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state nature is beset by material overflows which elude and thereby limit acts of 
sovereign authority (Whitehead, Jones, and Jones 2007, 15-16; Cunningham 2012); 
thus, transboundary water flows give biophysical permeability to geopolitical borders, 
circumscribing efforts by states to assert permanent sovereignty over hydrological 
resources.  
 
What warrants fluid sovereignty as a descriptor of the Hasbani watershed is that the 
Lebanese state, in the presence of competing power-wielders, has not secured a 
monopoly on effective centralization and territorialization of basin waters. While the 
bulk of the Hasbani River is on Lebanese territory, its downstream contribution to the 
upper Jordan River is a source of disputed volumetric control with Israel—one of a 
number of flashpoints over water allocation in the wider Jordan Basin (Feitelson and 
Fischhendler 2009; Messerschmid and Selby 2015). The inability of Lebanon 
effectively to uphold sovereign claims over what is seen as a national water 
resource, frustrated in its plans to extract more water from the Hasbani River, attests 
to a sharp asymmetry over control of its flow regime. Zeitoun et al. capture neatly the 
relevant power relation with their notion of “remote control” whereby Israel is able to 
exert a governing influence over the Hasbani without direct physical control of the 
territory through which it runs (2013). However, while Zeitoun et al. view this as a 
“decoupling of territory and water” (2013, 101), we argue below that it expresses fluid 
relations of sovereignty. Lebanon’s territorial deficit over the Hasbani Basin can be 
gauged in political geographic terms as a shortfall in geopower—“the statecraft and 
technologies of power that make territory and the biosphere accessible, legitimate, 
knowable, useable” (Parenti 2015, 835: see also Elden 2013, 49). 
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Recent discussion in critical political geography on state-nature relations has 
acknowledged the material embeddedness of territorial practices (Clark 2013; 
Depledge 2015; Grundy-Warr, Sithirith, and Li 2015; Ioris 2015; Steinberg and 
Peters 2015). Extending volumetric understandings of territory—as a bundle of 
political technologies for projecting power over land and terrain (Elden 2013, 36)—to 
encompass the geophysical conditions of sovereign agency, reveals territorial claims 
as efforts to secure valued flows of living and non-living things. For Grundy-Warr, 
Sithirith, and Li (2015, 94), the fluvial social-ecological-biophysical boundaries of 
contested watersheds offer palpable evidence of volatile material effects issuing from 
territorial moves to secure hydrological flows. Alongside volumetric claims from 
competing sovereigns, the complex hydrogeology of the Hasbani River, evident from 
the high seasonal and inter-annual variability of its flow regime, co-produces an 
unstable hydro-political nature. 
 
That fluid sovereignty is apposite as a characterization of state-nature relations in the 
Hasbani Basin reflects also Lebanon’s hybrid statehood, featuring patron-clientistic 
networks of largely sectarian power supported by rival international sponsors. These 
patron-client dynamics structure territorialized systems of land use governance in the 
south, heavily conditioning, for example, the scope of quarrying activities, agricultural 
subsidies and infrastructure development. In southern Lebanon the geopolitical 
dominance of Hizbullah is conventionally measured against its independent military 
capability (backed by Iran) as a self-proclaimed party of national resistance 
(muqawama) protecting Lebanese sovereignty from Israeli aggression and the threat 
of Sunni jihadist groups operating from Syria (Dionigi 2014, 107-109; Khatib 2014, 
116-17). From the perspective of Western governments, Hizbullah’s role in wider 
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circulations of violence and criminality in the Middle East amplifies the contingency of 
Lebanese sovereignty (Elden 2009, 85-99; Borneman 2012, 124-26; United States 
Drug Enforcement Administration 2016). However, Hizbullah has a strong political 
base of support in the south, oversees an extensive network of social service 
provision and has normalized its relationship with the state, taking part from 2008-11 
in a national unity government. Fregonese (2012) deftly separates out the different 
constructions of “weak” Lebanese statehood at play in international and national 
discourses, arguing that Lebanon’s domestic sovereignty is materially enacted 
through complex hybridizations between state and nonstate actors. Lebanese water 
governance exhibits these hybrid properties, featuring, for example, competing logics 
of geopower between patron-client structures and Western-dominated international 
development agencies. Eid-Sabbagh (2015, 129-163) documents how the efforts of 
external donors to finance, and reform, Lebanese water management according to 
marketization norms, has floundered in the face of resistance from patron-client 
networks (including in the south) protecting their sources of rent. 
 
Not surprisingly, the contingent nature of Lebanese sovereignty has invited 
application of Giorgio Agamben’s (1998; 2005) work on sovereign power and the 
state of exception, a major wellspring for critical geographical analysis of sovereignty 
and violence (e.g. Gregory 2006; Kearns 2006; Minca 2007; Reid-Henry 2007). In 
his research on Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, Ramadan (2005) encounters 
the “zone of indistinction”—between law and nature, outside and inside, violence and 
law—that, for Agamben (1998, 64), occupies the charged borderlands of sovereign 
power. The “multiple partially sovereign actors” (Ramadan 2005, 158) contesting 
power in and beyond these camps are symptomatic of a Lebanese sovereigntyscape 
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in which the means of coercion have yet to be effectively controlled by the state, 
despite the call of the UN Security Council, under resolution 1559 (2004) for “strict 
respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity, and political independence of 
Lebanon under the sole and exclusive authority of the Government of Lebanon 
throughout Lebanon”. 
 
Critical receptions of Agamben by geographers have taken issue with his unremitting 
statism, conflating political authority with a unitary, omnipotent state (Agnew 2005, 
439; Elden 2009, 55-61; Jones 2012, 687). More central here to the fluid constitution 
of Lebanese state nature in the Hasbani Basin—its entanglement of human and 
more-than-human elements—is Agamben’s assertion that “the fundamental activity 
of sovereign power is the production of bare life as originary political element and as 
threshold of articulation between nature and culture, zoē and bios” (1998, 181). 
Modern sovereign power, in Agamben’s formulation, rests on the technological 
regulation of bare life in order facilitate “biopolitical” control over human individuals 
and populations (Smith 2009, 105). A forceful objection by Jacques Derrida to 
philosophy of nature at play here is that, in muddling the Aristotelian notions of bare 
life (zoē) and individual or group life (bios), Agamben offers an essentialist idea of 
sovereignty insensitive to historical-geographical configurations of political authority 
(Derrida 2009, 315-317: see also Coleman and Grove 2009, 504). For Agamben 
sovereignty is constituted in part by the political domination of bare (“natural”) life. 
This mirrors Western self-conceptions of political sovereignty founded on a concept 
of human responsibility in which forms of nonhuman life are made mute (Derrida 
2009, 116-20). Critically interrogating this anthropocentric stance, and the wider 
nature/culture oppositions sustaining it, leads Derrida to propose the idea of divisible 
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sovereignty: “the question is not that of sovereignty or nonsovereignty but that of the 
modalities of transfer and division of sovereignty said to be indivisible—said and 
supposed to be indivisible but always divisible” (2009, 291). 
 
Fluid sovereignty is one such modality of divisible sovereignty, not only signifying 
multiple wielders of (geo)power within a territory, but signaling also Derrida’s 
ontological claim that the human exceptionalism of political sovereignty unravels 
amidst the porous boundaries between the human and nonhuman. The 
anthropocentric (Hobbesian) fiction is of the sovereign state as instituted solely 
through human control and convention, outside that which is natural (Derrida 2009, 
42). Yet at the same time representations of political sovereignty are, Derrida claims, 
often suffused by figures of human animality or bestiality, such as contemporary 
references to the savagery of “rogue states” (2009, 19-20). As Whitehead, Jones, 
and Jones note, “in order to frame nature the state itself must become involved with, 
and entangled in, a range of objects, devices and things” (2007, 54). In the section of 
the article on hydro-climatic flows and sovereignty, we draw on germane work from 
environmental geography on so-called “vital” or “immanent” materialism (e.g. 
Bingham and Hinchcliffe 2008; Braun 2008; Clark 2010; Lorimer 2012), scholarship 
reflecting, and feeding, a more general rise of geophilosophy in the social sciences 
and humanities (Bennett 2010; Clark 2011; Woodward 2013; Ingold 2015). Vital 
materialism posits a nonhuman nature actively assembling with, and independently 
affecting, the discursive and material practices of humans in emergent groupings of 
matter-energy. With their topological unity, watersheds are a palpable expression of 
such an assemblage, as the “natural” water flows within a physical catchment 
become reconstituted by the co-mingling of human and non-human elements. 
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Treating the ocean as a spatial trope for reimagining geographical work on territory 
as volume, Steinberg and Peters (2015) coin the term “wet ontology” to capture the 
dynamic, more-than-human materiality of geographical moves to secure volume. 
This materiality is seen as inseparable from experiences of place and affective 
relations (2015, 256). In examining below water-related vulnerabilities of farming 
households in the Hasbani Basin, we consider the lived experience of fluid 
sovereignty as registered by those with a livelihood dependence on secure access to 
agricultural water. The co-production of fluid sovereignty by unstable hydro-political 
and hydro-climatic flows is received as a threat to livelihoods, prompting from 
farmers a range of coping practices. Revealed are mutual and affective relations that 
respond autonomously to a precarious hydrosphere, challenging the legitimacy of a 
Lebanese state unable to exert volumetric control over basin waters. We turn now to 
Lebanese state framings of the Hasbani Basin, which bear a divisible sovereignty 
imprint of stalled and interrupted processes of post-colonial state formation. 
 
 
State nature(s) 
Lebanese efforts to centralize and territorialize Hasbani water resources as state 
nature have faltered in the face of cross-border pressures from a stronger 
neighbouring sovereign, but also reveal long-standing domestic failings to exercise 
epistemic and political authority over the water yield of the Hasbani River. The 
(post)colonial roots of Lebanon’s underdeveloped water resources can only be 
hinted at here, but reveal an enduring subordination of hydrological self-
determination to the interests of occupying states and other external powers. 
14 
 
Ottoman codification of water use from the 1870s corresponded with the 
institutionalization of sectarian administrative structures serving favored client groups 
rather than broader constituencies of need. Under the French mandate in the 1920s, 
decrees vested state ownership of water resources as part of the public domain, 
creating the legal basis for ostensible moves to modernize water sector development 
and management, yet in practice reinforcing sectarian (notably Maronite Christian) 
preferences for supplying urban centers (Mallat 1995; Makdisi 2012). At the same 
time, the fluid southern border of Lebanon, subject to competing French and British 
claims in the wake of the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement, was moved northwards to 
concede to British Mandate Palestine significant water resources (the Hula Marshes) 
in anticipation of future Jewish settlement (Zeitoun et al. 2012, 23-24). After the 
founding of the State of Israel in 1948, Arab-Israeli disputes over water utilization in 
the upper Jordan deployed hydro-strategic claims within the broader regional 
conflict, prompting unsuccessful US efforts under the Johnston Mission to 
desecuritize state water framings of the Jordan River (Alatout 2011). 
 
The stalled development of the water sector in southern Lebanon is an historical-
geographic flipside of the Israeli hydraulic mission of centralized water development 
and the territorialization of sovereign claims over the Jordan River, which saw the 
development from 1955 of a national water carrier conveying water from the upper 
Jordan to southern Israel (Feitelson and Fischhendler 2009; Alatout 2011). While the 
simultaneous Lebanese development of hydroelectric dams signaled a centralizing 
drive by the state to fuel economic growth, unrealized plans to modernize irrigation 
infrastructure heightened the marginalization of southern agricultural communities. 
Makdisi (2012, 214) attributes the political rise of the Shi’a in southern Lebanon at 
15 
 
least in part to this systemic neglect. Hizbullah’s hybrid sovereignty, forged first in 
military exchanges with Israel in the 1980s, exploited domestic and external deficits 
in Lebanese sovereign authority, including its weak territorial control of water 
resources in the Hasbani Basin. Since the Israeli bombing in 1965 of a Hasbani-
Banias water diversion project, water infrastructure in southern Lebanon has 
frequently been damaged by Israeli military actions, with the systemic degradation of 
the water sector—including irrigation systems— a direct and indirect consequence of 
the Israeli occupation of the region from 1982. 
 
The end of the occupation in 2000 coincided with moves by the Lebanese state to 
centralize a fragmented system of water governance, enacting laws to create 
regional water establishments (including for southern Lebanon) with a view, 
promoted by foreign donors, to future privatization (Makdisi 2007, 374-76: Eid-
Sabbagh 2015, 95). Plans were drawn up for major water sector investments in the 
Hasbani catchment, including the Ibl al Saqi Dam Project to expand regional 
irrigation networks, but progress was hampered by resource constraints and 
politicized bargaining featuring a complex array of (para)state institutions. At the 
same time, there remains endemic corruption in local water resources management: 
it is widely alleged, for example, that any proposed water project will only go ahead 
with agreed backhand payments to local politicians.3 Major water allocation and 
management responsibilities in the Hasbani Basin are contested between the 
Ministry of Energy and Water and the strategic national bodies—the Council for 
Reconstruction and Development, the Council of the South—charged with regional 
recovery. Environment and development NGOs in the Hasbani Basin claim that the 
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national government has for decades exercised little authority in the region, 
continually failing to meet the water and sanitation needs of local communities.4 
 
Lebanon’s incomplete territorialization of the Hasbani catchment is evident in its 
weak volumetric control of basin waters. Part of this shortfall in geopower derives 
from a lack of authoritative knowledge of regional water resources: at the national 
level the monitoring of hydrological data is fragmented and unreliable, with no central 
agency analysing and disseminating relevant information (Eid Sabbagh 2015, 45; 
Farajalla et al. 2015, 21). Flow records of the Hasbani River ceased during the civil 
war and Israeli occupation, but drawing on data published by the Hydrological 
Service of Israel, recent estimates of mean annual flow converge at 122-23 MCM 
(million cubic meters) (Zeitoun et al. 2012, 42; UN-ESCWA and BGR 2013, 181). 
Across the whole basin, abstractions from both river and groundwater sources are 
estimated at no more than 8 MCM/year (Zeitoun et al. 2012, 51). The lack of 
authoritative data on precipitation, infiltration and aquifer recharge creates 
uncertainty over precise “natural” groundwater flows; yet substantial groundwater 
fluxes from southern Lebanon into Israel demonstrate a major hydrological obstacle 
to greater physical control by Lebanon of Hasbani waters. 
 
At the southern end of the Hasbani River, gravity-led transfers into Israel are 
precisely monitored by a series of flow gauges, for Israel’s greater epistemic 
authority over transboundary water balances, driven by a state security imperative of 
hydro-political control, supports a status quo of sovereign entitlement according to 
established prior use. As noted above, this is accurately labeled as “remote control” 
(Zeitoun et al. 2013) in the sense that ongoing water use is maintained without direct 
17 
 
physical control over the hydrological terrain from which that water issues. We claim, 
though, that in the Hasbani borderlands this volumetric hold rests on the continual 
(re)production of sovereign (Israeli) violence. Whether threatened or exercised as 
military force, this projection of power also imposes, from a Lebanese perspective, 
the slow violence of externally constrained water resources development. In other 
words, the surface water and groundwater flows of the Hasbani Basin are partly 
constituted by the strategic calculations and interventions of a hegemonic sovereign. 
Strident Israeli opposition to increased Lebanese water abstractions in the region 
has delayed the Ibl al Saqi Dam Project and the limited the Wazzani Water Supply 
Project. A vital part of the latter initiative is the Wazzani Pumping Station (Figure 2) 
designed to reach a capacity of 4.4 MCM/year, but its announcement in August 2002 
by the Council of the South provoked Israel to warn of war on account of its 
perceived downstream impacts (UN-ESCWA and BGR 2013, 198). 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
 
That this was not an idle threat seemed to be borne out four years later, during the 
2006 war between Israel and Hizbullah, when the Wazzani Pumping Station 
Reservoir was partly destroyed by Israel Defense Forces (IDF) shells—part of 
extensive IDF-related damage to public water reservoirs and other water 
infrastructure in southern Lebanon. A recent survey of this damage cautions against 
attributing hydro-political motives to Israeli actions, even if the degradation of 
Lebanese water infrastructure reinforced the asymmetric circulation of transboundary 
water resources in the region (Zeitoun, Eid-Sabbagh, and Loveless 2014). Khayyat 
and Shibli (2011, 268) interpret the 2006 summer conflict more starkly as a “war 
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against the landscape” (identifying also widespread IDF-related damage to villages, 
electrical supply lines and agricultural resources). Such “infrastructure warfare” 
(Graham 2007) is recognized as a core principle of Israeli military strategy, as honed 
in successive campaigns against Lebanese and Palestinian targets.5 
 
Lebanese framing of Hasbani Basin waters as state nature is marred by the 
militarization of land and airspace across the borderlands with Israel, including the 
occupied Golan Heights. After the 2006 war, and in support of Lebanese 
sovereignty, United Nations Security Resolution 1701 (2006) expanded the mandate 
of UNIFIL to monitor a zone, between the Blue Line and the Litani River, free of all 
armed personnel. However, in the UNIFIL eastern sector covering the southern half 
of the Hasbani Basin, the ceasefire on the border has regularly been breached by 
exchanges of fire between Hizbullah and the IDF, with growing spillovers from the 
Syrian conflict. In January 2015, for example, in response to an Israeli airstrike on a 
Hizbullah convoy in the Syrian Golan—the fatalities from which included a senior 
Hizbullah commander and Iranian general—Hizbullah militants fired anti-tank rockets 
at an IDF convoy in the Shab’a Farms area killing two Israeli soldiers: the IDF 
responded by shelling Hizbullah positions along the border.6 Both sides routinely 
violate the demilitarized zone in a vertical geopolitical confrontation, and dynamic 
balance of deterrence, that reflects their asymmetric capabilities in projecting force. 
Thus, Hizbullah exploits its subterranean mastery of the southern Hasbani region to 
maintain a “defensive” network of tunnels and bunkers, while the IDF almost daily 
violates Lebanese airspace by military jets and surveillance drones (United Nations 
Security Council 2014, 3). 
 
19 
 
This violent environment, veering erratically between low- and high-intensity conflict, 
is experienced by Hasbani Basin farmers for whom outside military interference 
(tadakhol) is a serious threat to lives and livelihoods. Aerial power over lives and 
livelihoods, as a display of sovereign force, produces multiple vectors of spatio-
temporal control (Weizman 2007; Adey, Whitehead, and Williams 2013). In southern 
Lebanon an enduring, deadly impact of the 2006 war, pockmarking the land, is the 
substantial number of unexploded cluster bombs and landmines—a dangerous 
terrain which farmers navigate by shared assessments of accessibility and risk. The 
fluid sovereignty of the Hasbani catchment is intensified in proximity to the 
borderlands adjoining the Blue Line. Israel has consistently pressed for the exclusion 
from the Blue Line of the eastern bank of the Hasbani River, south of the divided 
village of Al-Ghajar (Figure 3), where it forms a short (3 km) border between 
Lebanon and the Israeli-occupied Shab’a Farms and Golan Heights (United Nations 
2000). Israeli militarization of the otherwise uninhabited Shab’a Farms indicates the 
geostrategic value of this land at the crossroads of Lebanon, Israel and the Golan 
Heights. Claimed by Lebanon, but of indefinite territorial status since the French 
Mandate, its hydro-political significance for Israel derives from Shab’a Farms 
covering part of the recharge area of the Liddan Springs, principal source for the 
Liddan (Dan) tributary. At 241 MCM, the mean annual flow of the Liddan is 
approximately double that both of the Hasbani and Banias (the other two tributaries 
of the upper Jordan) feeding into Lake Tiberias, Israel’s main freshwater reservoir 
(Zeitoun et al. 2012, 41). Thus, the territorialization of the Shab’a Farms as Israeli 
state nature facilitates fuller volumetric control over the water resources of the Dan 
River, whilst at the same time undermining Lebanese territorial claims to this area. 
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INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE 
 
 
Fluid materiality and state nature 
Insofar as the state natures of the Hasbani catchment reveal competing and 
discordant acts of territorialization for volumetric control over the river, the fluid 
materiality of the waters themselves becomes decisive, including their role in wider 
processes of hydrospheric circulation (Bear and Bull 2011; Bakker 2012; Lavau 
2013; Steinberg and Peters 2015, 252-54, Swyngedouw 2015). As noted above, vital 
materialist approaches accord explanatory weight to the autonomous play of 
geophysical and biophysical forces. The notion that nonhuman entities exhibit a 
causal integrity of their own is evident both in actor network theoretical claims that 
there is a bilateral grouping or co-constitution of the human and more-than-human 
(Latour 2004; Bennett 2010) and also, more radically, the speculative realist thesis 
positing a spatio-temporal asymmetry of earth processes vis-à-vis human 
becoming—“that we might need to think of the entire zone of human-nonhuman 
interchange as itself nothing more than a concrete, localized and contingent region in 
the midst of an overwhelming inhuman expanse” (Clark 2011, 48-49). From the latter 
position, anthropogenic climate change finds a geological analogue, the mid-
Pliocene (3.3 to 3 Ma), which is far outside the moral-practical compass of political 
sovereignty yet must somehow still be registered in terms of human choices (Clark 
2010, 49). Sensitizing sovereignty to the deep temporality of geological terrain 
expresses Derrida’s claim that political sovereignty has more than one ground, more 
than one solidity (2009, 34). The focus in this section is on the political effects of the 
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Hasbani Basin as a hydro-climatic assemblage, notably the volatility and 
unpredictability of “natural” water transfers to agriculture. 
 
The Hasbani River has a surface catchment area of 698km2 and the highest flow 
variability of the three Upper Jordan headwaters, ranging from 30-304 MCM a year. 
Its principal sources, the Hasbani and Wazzani springs, receive strong groundwater 
pulses from winter precipitation and snow-melt on the north-eastern mountain slopes 
of the basin (UN-ESCWA and BGR 2013, 181-82).7 Peak monthly river flows in 
February and March are also boosted by three tributaries and their seasonal rivulets. 
From the elevated mostly karstic terrain of Jurassic dolomite limestone and 
dolostones in the east, the basin drains across calcareous slopes and a volcanic 
plateau towards the Marjeyoun plain in the south-west (largely composed of Pliocene 
basalts) where the Wazzani tributary joins the main river. This sketch of the terrain 
masks a complex hydrogeology for which the mapping and modeling of groundwater 
flows is problematic. In such karst environments, localized variations in the 
permeability of the terrain mean that rainfall events can trigger unpredictable 
groundwater discharges (Rimmer and Salingar 2006, 526; Zeitoun et al. 2012, 45). 
The material agency of the river itself is of course still more expansive and dynamic, 
continuously breaking down and remaking itself through multiple assemblages of 
inorganic and organic objects. Current “natural” flows are not substantially altered in 
quantity by direct human impacts, though there are significant qualitative changes as 
a result of untreated water discharges and runoff contamination from pesticides and 
chemical fertilizers (Badr, Holail, and Olama 2014). 
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The framing of the Hasbani catchment as stressed by human demands and climate 
change has informed claims both challenging and justifying the legitimacy of the 
Lebanese state. On the one hand, municipal and civil society representatives in the 
Hasbani Basin charge the national government—notably the Council of the South—
with systematically neglecting their concerns about declining access to agricultural 
water. Since 2000 the lack of state investment in regional water infrastructure is 
attributed in large part to an institutional deficit in political authority.8 On the other 
hand, the portrayal of the Hasbani Basin as “water-stressed” informs argument made 
by senior Lebanese government officials to justify national volumetric claims vis-à-vis 
Israel. Thus, Comair (2015) invokes integrated water management norms to argue, 
in the context of purported water deficiencies, that a more sustainable, equitable use 
of the “total water mass”9 of the Jordan Basin justifies a “return” to Lebanon of the 
Shab’a Farms.  
 
Lebanese representations of climate change feed a narrative of growing water 
scarcity—a water resource crisis compounded, the government claims, by the 
arrival, since 2011, of over a million Syrian refugees (Eid-Sabbagh 2015, 46-51: 
Republic of Lebanon 2015, 1-2). In its second national communication to the UN 
climate change convention, the Lebanese government anticipates significant 
reductions in the volume of total water resources as a result of decreased 
precipitation and greater drought frequency, with the effects most intense in those 
regions, like the south, economically reliant on climate-sensitive agricultural 
production (Ministry of Environment 2011, xiv-xv; Farajalla et al. 2014).10 This 
economic dependence is marked in the Hasbani Basin, where 70 per cent of the 
regional population work in an agricultural sector dominated by small, family-run 
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landholdings (Charrouf 2012, 278-79). Furthermore, the politically insecure status of 
the region, hampering national reconstruction plans, has stalled the modernization of 
agriculture, rendering it more sensitive to climactic stresses. Almost all the rural 
households questioned in the 2013 field survey relied on rainfall for their agricultural 
water needs; and while olive production—the dominant rain-fed crop in the basin—is 
resilient in the face of high temperatures and summer droughts, farmers in the olive-
growing Hasbaya District (Figure 4) already report yield reductions from lower winter 
precipitation over the past decade.11 
 
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE 
 
 
The materiality of hydro-climatic flows corresponds, through an exchange of 
properties, with the human experience of fluid events and volumes. From the survey 
of farming households conducted in the Hasbani Basin, almost all respondents (97 
per cent) perceived an increase in mean temperatures over the last 20 years, though 
perceptions of annual rainfall changes were equivocal. More than half the sampled 
rural households reported no significant changes in runoff or spring flow: a quarter 
observed a decrease in runoff and fewer still (22 per cent) a decline in spring flow. Of 
the reported experience of rising temperatures, 88 per cent of respondents attributed 
these to climate change rather than climate variability; that is, a warming trend 
outside “natural” fluctuations. This experience of warming is consistent with 
Lebanese meteorological data demonstrating an upward temperature trend since 
1981 (Ministry of Environment 2011, 77). At the time of the survey, over three 
quarters of the respondents stated that the perceived rises in mean temperature had 
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not had a significant effect on their agricultural output, with only a minority reporting 
an output decline that was either moderate (12 per cent) or extreme (1 per cent). 
 
Nevertheless, hydro-climatic changes are recognized as a major challenge to 
agricultural livelihood options. 88 per cent of the farmers surveyed in the Hasbani 
basin stated that climate change reduced water availability for agriculture, above all 
by higher crop water requirements due to rising temperatures. The multi-crop 
cultivation model followed by most farming households in the region has traditionally 
favored fruit crops—cherries, apples, grapevine—which are sensitive to high winter 
temperatures (Ministry of Environment 2011, 96-98). Yet across a predominantly 
Druze farming population, unforeseen climatic events tend to be received with 
equanimity: “everything is from God—what comes from nature we cope with”.12 
Highly germane in this respect is that Jebal El Sheikh (Mount Hermon), a source of 
the Hasbani River, has deep religious meaning for the Druze as the site of the 
transfiguration of Christ—one of their major prophets. 
 
Affective conditions of fluid sovereignty 
Fluid sovereignty, as a form of divisible sovereignty, suggests openness to how 
projections of state nature shape, and are received by, political subjects, although 
Derrida ignores the practical conditions of sovereignty encountered in everyday life. 
In their discussion of state-nature relations, Whitehead, Jones, and Jones (2007) 
similarly underplay the lived experience of those affected by national projects of 
centralization and territorialization. The (tacit) agreement or presumed consent of 
affected populations is a source of legitimacy for state framings of nature—a 
necessary part of what Ioris calls the “socio-ecological embeddedness of state 
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activity” (2015, 169). Disaffection with the material and/or ideological manifestations 
of state nature can disrupt this legitimacy: under conditions of fluid sovereignty, 
where state natures are fractured or otherwise incomplete, legitimation problems are 
more likely to flare up. 
 
For farming households in the Hasbani Basin, the co-production of water scarcity by 
hydro-political and hydro-climatic flows is experienced as a threat to livelihoods 
within a context of state neglect of agriculture. Patron-client networks are 
instrumental in this neglect. As noted by Eid-Sabbagh (2015, 208-209), Lebanese 
food subsidies and other state support for agriculture strongly favor land and capital 
owning elites. Tobacco subsidies, the only noteworthy subsidy to poorer farmers in 
the south, were first introduced during the Israeli occupation to incentivize farmers to 
stay on the land, but expressly serve the Shi’a clientele of Hizbullah and Amal. The 
majority Druze population of the Hasbani Basin has periodically extracted patronage 
rents from the national government; for example, Druze control in the 1990s of a 
ministry (Ministry of the Displaced) that paid for modest upgrades of water 
infrastructure in the south (Eid-Sabbagh 2015, 75). Yet this intermittent influence has 
not offset the domestic political dynamics favoring more powerful parties and urban-
oriented economic development priorities. 
 
The survey of rural households across the Hasbani Basin revealed farmers sharing 
an affective condition of precariousness—a structure of feeling characterized as the 
lived experience of an unstable present and uncertain future (Anderson 2014, 130-
131). Farming livelihoods, chosen amidst severely circumscribed economic options, 
are rendered precarious by deficits and uncertain prospects in the availability of 
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agricultural water, both as a perceived outcome of climate change and cross-border 
military exchanges. The economic susceptibility of farming households to agricultural 
water scarcity is heightened by the preponderance of small landowners and tenant 
farmers with minimal financial assets.13 
 
To be sure, farmers adopt a number of practices to cope with shortfalls in the 
availability of agricultural water. These include rainwater harvesting, changes in crop 
selection, greenhouse cultivation and switching irrigation type (typically to drip 
irrigation). Awareness of climate change is borne out by Hasbani Basin survey data 
showing perceived increases in mean temperature as the most likely environmental 
determinant for triggering longer-term adaptive responses in farming, such as shifts 
from fruit crops to olive trees and pine nuts (the latter also encouraged by high prices 
following a government ban on pine nut imports). Yet while farmers have started to 
adapt to changing hydro-climatic conditions, national government assistance was 
seen as insufficient by half the survey respondents. Towards the border with Israel 
and the occupied Golan Heights, farming households charged a wholesale failure of 
the Lebanese state to address reductions in water availability mainly attributed to 
transboundary security risks; for example, the avoidance by farmers of agricultural 
well-drilling up to 15 km from this border on account of perceived risk from IDF 
incursions. 
 
Indeed, the avoidance or abandonment of lands deemed unsafe was, for both survey 
respondents and focus group participants, the primary means of defensive coping in 
the face of differential water availability across a risky landscape. Different spatio-
temporal configurations of (para)military violence—including the proximity of mines, 
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cluster munitions, and the fire-range of IDF border positions—are grasped through 
lived experience, generating a practical geography of precarious terrain; for example, 
the gradation of dangerous lands according to whether mine clearance did not take 
place (ard khatera), or still in doubt that clearance was completed (ard mushakkaka), 
or uncertain whether it was done at all (ard mumken mullaghama). Not surprisingly, 
physical damage to farming assets from outside military interference (tadakhol) 
significantly reduces the propensity of farmers to adopt coping practices that signal a 
long-term commitment to the land (e.g. greenhouse cultivation, irrigation). Economic 
losses resulting from responses to IDF cross-border actions (e.g. land abandonment 
or neglect from fear of bodily harm) also hinder the adoption of coping practices, 
though to a lesser extent than direct damage to agricultural assets. An improved 
security situation, facilitated by an effective protective presence of the Lebanese 
government, was viewed by farmers as an essential precondition for large-scale 
adaptive measures to climate-induced water stress, notably agricultural land 
reclamation and investment in irrigation infrastructure. 
 
The persistence of precariousness as an affective condition amongst the farming 
communities is registered through, and shapes, their place-based attachments. 
When asked directly in the Hasbani focus group why they remained on the land, 
participants stressed its identity-bestowing properties, encompassing ethno-religious, 
national and even pan-Arab affiliations. There is no simple relationship between the 
risk of violence and these telluric identities. While Israeli military actions encroaching 
on Hasbani rural livelihoods are, through the reproduction of a collective resistance 
identity, reported to intensify cultural valuation of “our” land and water, the cross-
border threat from Syria posed by Islamist militants has divided the Druze community 
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in the Hasbani Basin. Clashes at the end of 2014 between Jabhat al-Nusra and pro-
Assad Druze fighters on the eastern (Syrian) flank of Jebal El Sheikh created 
tensions amongst Druze political leaders in Lebanon—between calls to maintain 
neutrality (Walid Jumblatt, Druze Progressive Socialist Party) and calls to fight 
alongside Hizbullah against Jabhat al-Nusra (Talal Arslan, Lebanese Democratic 
Party). The reported self-arming of some Druze residents of Rachaya and Hasbaya, 
whether for self-defense or for planned military assistance to Syrian Druze (Al-
Akhbar 2014), attests to a regional population unconvinced that the lightly equipped 
Lebanese army can effectively protect local communities from external threats of 
(para)military violence. 
 
The lived experience of precariousness by farming communities is a salient affective 
response to fluid sovereignty in the Hasbani Basin. It expresses a mingling of shared 
sentiment with unruly material circulations, recalling the vital materialist notion that 
human experience “includes encounters with an out-side that is active, forceful, and 
(quasi)independent” (Bennett  2010, 17). For those farming Hasbani lands, safe and 
reliable access to water is unsettled by hydro-political and hydro-climatic flows, 
including transboundary projections and counter-projections of (geo)power involving 
rival sovereigns (Israel and Lebanon) and a paramilitary actor (Hizbullah). Staying on 
the land, using water more efficiently, selecting drought-resistant crops—all are 
activities mixing more-than-human materials to produce agrarian natures in the face 
of high consequence risks. Participants regard these as autonomous responses in 
the wake of the unsuccessful consolidation of Lebanese state nature across the 
Hasbani catchment. The inability of the state to secure control over Hasbani flows, 
which reflects dysfunctional policy-making (e.g. organizational failings over water 
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infrastructure and patron-client favoritism) and regional security weaknesses (partial 
command of Lebanese territory and airspace), significantly accounts for the low 
legitimacy of the national government in the eyes of Hasbani farming communities. 
 
Conclusion 
In this article we introduce the concept of fluid sovereignty to denote configurations 
of state authority in which flows of living and non-living things, within and across 
national borders, render insecure claims to unconditional territorial rule. Loss of 
monopoly control of the means of violence within a territory conventionally signals 
weak state sovereignty, as evident in scholarly and policy discourse on “fragile” 
states, including Lebanon. However, the figure of fluid sovereignty brings to the fore 
state-nature relations neglected in this discourse, opening up a world of political 
authority in which more-than-human materials enter into, are enrolled by, and 
overflow mechanisms of territorial governance. Philosophical grounding here is 
provided by Derrida’s (2009; 2011) critique of anthropocentric logics of political 
sovereignty, while the conceptualization by Whitehead, Jones, and Jones (2007) of 
state framings of nature—realized through processes of centralization and 
territorialization—allows historic-geographical analysis of particular material and 
symbolic manifestations of state nature. We employ this approach to examine fluid 
sovereignty in the Hasbani Basin, southern Lebanon as a form of unconsolidated 
state nature, supplemented by recent insights from critical political geography on 
territorialization as a political technology for securing volumetric control over valued 
flows (Elden 2013; Grundy-Warr, Sithirith, and Li 2015; Stenberg and Peters 2015). 
Fluid sovereignty makes conceptual room for state-nature relations in which flows of 
living and non-living things unsettle or destabilize territorial rule-making. 
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The incomplete territorialization by Lebanon of the Hasbani catchment evinces 
fractured state nature—the inability of the state to achieve volumetric control of basin 
waters. Lebanese shortfalls in water governance arise domestically from institutional 
deficits (e.g. the absence of authoritative information on hydrological flows and 
abstractions) and policy neglect of water infrastructure in the south under prevailing 
patron-clientistic structures of power. These challenges are compounded by the 
break on greater Lebanese uptake of Hasbani flows imposed by a stronger 
neighboring sovereign: Israeli volumetric authority, underscored by a willingness to 
use force in Lebanon to defend hydraulic interests, is legally justified according to 
downstream entitlements of established prior use. At the same time, Hizbullah’s 
military action across the Blue Line against Israel, internally justified as “defensive 
jihād” against an occupying entity (Dionigi 2014, 106), notably in Al-Ghajar and 
Shab’a Farms, disrupts rulings by the international community (e.g. UN Security 
Council Resolution 1701 (2006)) that monopoly control of the means of violence over 
Lebanese territory resides in the Lebanese state—as displayed, for example, by the 
stationing of Lebanese Armed Forces at the Wazzani Pumping Station. The 
circulation within and across the Hasbani Basin of multiple means of violence is 
partly constitutive of its fluid sovereignty. 
 
However, the unconsolidated state nature of the Hasbani Basin is co-produced by 
the fluid materiality of the waters themselves, whose unruly hydro-climatic flows are 
at odds with territorial moves to exercise volumetric control. Already prone to high 
seasonal and inter-annual fluctuations on account of a complex hydrogeology, the 
Hasbani River flow regime is arguably undergoing a step change to an uncharted 
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range of variability induced by regional climate change. Farming communities in the 
Hasbani Basin dependent on access to rain-fed agricultural water perceive an 
increase in mean temperatures over the last two decades (consistent with Lebanese 
meteorological data), reporting higher crop water requirements as a consequence. 
The materiality of changing hydro-climatic flows corresponds with local experiences 
of local water- and weather worlds; and despite various coping practices employed 
by Hasbani farming households, recent regional warming accentuates conflict-
related water stresses on farming livelihoods, generating an affective condition of 
precariousness. This shared experience of precariousness by farming communities 
is a both a salient response to fluid sovereignty and symbolically contributes to its 
reproduction through the withdrawal of legitimacy from a Lebanese government 
viewed as failing to protect local communities from transboundary water-related 
threats. 
 
It is important, finally, to avoid equating fluid sovereignty with unconsolidated state 
nature. Whitehead, Jones, and Jones caution against the suggestion that “nature is 
ever successfully or unproblematically framed by the state” (2007, 15; see also 
Swyngedouw 2015, 223-225). On a philosophical level, this claim expresses an 
ontological stance, affirmed in this article, that state-nature relations are always in a 
process of becoming, in which their constituent parts are inter-related and co-
evolving. So also fluid sovereignty invites understandings that critically question the 
notion that state sovereignty is instituted solely by human agency. Furthermore, 
analytical attention to the role that flows of living and non-living things—watery flows 
in this article—play in enabling or disabling the spatial spread on state nature, adds a 
vital environmental lens to empirical assessments of weak statehood. Following 
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these flows, within and across national borders, as they express, escape or erode 
projections of sovereign power may lead to deeper accounts of the becomings of 
state nature. 
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(5) Notes 
1. The Blue Line is a boundary marked out to determine accordance with United 
Nations Security Resolution 425 (1978), which called for Israel to cease its military 
action against Lebanese territorial integrity and to withdraw its force from all 
Lebanese territory. Full implementation of resolution 425 was recognised by the 
Security Council in June 2000 (United Nations Security Council 2000), but Lebanon 
regards Shab’a Farms, part of Al-Ghajar village and Kafar Shouba Hills as Lebanese 
territory still occupied by Israel. 
2. The rural questionnaire survey was conducted between January and April 2013, 
sampling agricultural communities across the three administrative districts of the 
Hasbani region—Rachaya (north), 66 responses; Hasbaya (mid-region), 103 
responses; and Marjeyoun (south), 127 responses. Arabic (administered) and 
English versions of the questionnaire, along with questionnaire data, are available 
from the authors. The focus group, held on 27 September 2013 in the Snoubra 
Hotel, Hasbaya, was attended by 23 participants, including farmers, local 
government representatives and rural cooperative organizers. Follow-up interviews 
were conducted in June 2014. 
3. Personal communication: Lebanese civil society representative, Beirut 9 June 
2014. The challenge of corruption in the Lebanese water sector is addressed by 
Farajalla et al. (2015). 
4. Interview: Lebanese NGO director, Hasbaya, 10 June 2014. 
5. In 2008 this was labeled the “Dahiya doctrine” by IDF general Gadi Eizenkot after 
the IDF-directed destruction of the Dahiya area of Beirut during the 2006 war: Y. 
Katz. 2010. ‘The Dahiya Doctrine: Fighting dirty or a knock-out punch?’ The 
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Jerusalem Post 28 January: http://www.jpost.com/Features/Front-Lines/The-Dahiya-
Doctrine-Fighting-dirty-or-a-knock-out-punch (last accessed 4 April 2016). 
6. A Spanish UN peacekeeper deployed near Al-Ghajar was killed during this clash: 
See: http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=49929#.VSZrPF9wbGg (last 
accessed 4 April 2016). 
7. While these broad parameters are widely accepted, it should be noted that the 
hydrological description of the Hasbani catchment (and Jordan River) in the UN-
ESCWA and BGR (2013) report has been challenged: see Messerschmid and Selby 
(2015). 
8. Focus group, Hasbaya, 27 September 2013. 
9. “Total water mass”, estimated by Comair (2015) at 4 billion MCM/year, combines 
conventional (Jordan River Basin discharge) and non-conventional water sources 
(imports of water, treated wastewater, desalination and sea water springs): see 
Comair (2015). 
10. Climate change is forecast to reduce the total volume of water resources in 
Lebanon by 6-8% for a 10C increase in average annual temperature and by 12-16% 
for an increase of 20C (Ministry of Environment 2011, 114). This must be set against 
the government estimate that the arrival in Lebanon of 1.13 million Syrian refugees 
had, by the end of 2014, already increased national water demand by 12% (Republic 
of Lebanon 2015, 2). 
11. Interviews with farmers, Hasbaya District, June 2014: the high level of rainfed 
agriculture accords with Charrouf’s (2012, 272) estimate of 95% rainfed agriculture in 
the region. 
12. Field interview, famer, Hasbaya District, 10 June 2014 (translation from Arabic). 
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13. Most of the survey respondents were the landowner (91%) or co-owner (5%) with 
the remainder identifying themselves as tenant farmers or co-tenants. Farms tend to 
be long-established, family-run enterprises with, compared to urban centers, an 
ageing demographic: on average household sizes in the survey were five family 
members, 30 years of combined farming experience and only one additional 
individual working on the land. Rural landholdings tend to be small: 57% from 1-4 
dunums and 37% from 6-15 dunums (one Lebanese dunum is 1000 square meters). 
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(7) Figure captions 
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Figure 1: The Hasbani Basin, Lebanon (adapted from Zeitoun et al. 2013, 296) 
 
Figure 2: Wazzani pumping station (photo: Michael Mason) 
 
Figure 3: Al-Ghajar village adjoining Hasbani River, with Shab’a Farms in 
background (photo: Michael Mason) 
 
Figure 4: Spring water extraction at olive grove in Hasbaya District, upper Hasbani 
(photo: Michael Mason) 
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